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1.-j. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEIVIENT 
TI1is Comt has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78A-4-l 03(2)(h) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Cooper generally agrees with Dressels' statement of issues for review and with the 
applicable standard of review set forth on each issue. However, Dressels' brief fails to 
·~ include citation to the record demonstrating that the issues stated were preserved for 
appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
In addition, the Dressels raise other issues throughout their Brief as apparent bases 
for appeal, which are not addressed in Dressels' Statement of Issues for Review, and 
which issues should not be reviewed by this Court due to Dressels' failure to preserve 
..;;> those issues for appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The following Rules are determinative as to this appeal: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(A) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is predicated on a lease agreement in which the Appellants Nate and Jen 
Dressel were Tenants, and Appellees were the Landlords. The Dressels terminated the 
lease prior its term and abandoned the property. Accordingly, the Coopers sued for early 
termination fees, liquidated damages, and actual damages to the property pursuant to 
Lease's plain terms. The Coopers' process server left process with Jen Dressel's mother, 
Ms. McKellar, at 191 Moonlight Dr., Sequim, Washington. The 191 Moonlight Dr. 
address is the address that the Dressels gave to the Coopers for the Coopers to return the 
security deposit, and ostensibly, make other communications necessary after the 
Dressels' termination of the Lease. 191 Moonlight Dr. is also the location to which all of 
the Dressels' mail was forwarded. A Lexis-Nexis search indicated to the Coopers that 
191 Moonight Dr. was the Dressels' likely current address. Finally, the Dressels 
responded promptly to the Notice of Judgment that was mailed to 191 Moonlight Dr. by 
the Coopers, indicating that the Dressels were, in fact, receiving notices and documents 
delivered to that address. 
The Dressels filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After review of the parties' affidavits and 
arguments, the District Court denied the Dressels' Rule 60 Motion. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the District Court 
Appellees do not dispute Appe11ants' statement of the Course Proceedings and 
Disposition of the District Court at p. 3 of Appellants' brief. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Coopers and Dressels entered into a lease with respect to property located 
in Utah County (the "Property"). R. at 2, ,r 4. 
2. The Property consisted of a single family residence, which was furnished 
with Coopers' personal property items. R. at 2. 
3. The term of the lease was to be from November 13, 2013 to November 30, 
2014. R. at 10, 13. 
4. The Lease provided a clear and express early termination fee of "three (3) 
months of rent;" which amounted to $4050.00. R. at 3, ,r 12; R. at 10, ,r 3.3. 
5. The Lease also contains a clear and express liquidated damages provision, 
which does not require an election of remedies, ie, the Landlord is not required to elect 
either liquidated damages or early termination damages: 
If Tenant breaches any portion of this Agreement, including Tenant vacating prior 
to the completion of this Agreement ... Tenant understands the security deposit will 
be retained by Landlord as liquidated damages and any rent, late fees, past due utility 
and/or service bill or any other amounts still owing to Landlord shall be immediately 
due and payable. 
R. at 10, ,r 2.9. 
6. On or about August 1, 2014, a letter addressed from and signed by both 
:J Nate and Jen Dressel was sent to the Coopers, which clearly and unequivocally declared 
the Dressels' intention to terminate the lease prior to its term date: "This is a written 
6 
notice to inform you that as of August 1, 2014, we are no longer your tenants at 672 
Meadow Crest Way, Saratoga Springs, UT. We have vacated the property on the 
grounds of constructive eviction." R. at 119. 
7. The Dressels provided the following address where the Coopers could send 
items pertaining to the Lease: 191 Moonlight Dr., Sequim, WA 98382. R. at 119. 
8. Based on the Dressels' clear breach and actual termination of the Lease on 
August 1, 2014, the Coopers sent a letter to Dressels indicating that Coopers intended to 
exercise their rights and remedies under the Lease, namely, that the early termination fee 
of $4050 would be charged pursuant to Section 3 .3 of the Lease, and that Coopers would 
retain the security deposit as non-exclusive liquidated damages pursuant to Section 2.9 of 
the Lease. R. at 87. 
9. Regardless of whatever communications occurred between the Dressels and 
the subsequent purchaser of the Property, the Dressels plainly terminated the lease on 
August 1, 2014, which the Property was owned by the Coopers. R. at 119. 
10. The Coopers filed a lawsuit in the Fourth District Court on August 22, 2014 
alleging damages and the right of recovery as follows: 
a. The Early Termination Fee of $4050; 
b. Liquidated Damages of$1,650; 
C. 
d. 
R. at 5-6, 128-31. 
Additional damages to the property of at least $4,000; 
Attorneys fees of at least $1,500. 
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11. Coopers' ~omplaint did not seek any past due rent for the months of 
August, September, October, or November. See generally R. 4-7. 
12. In Coopers' efforts to serve the Complaint on the Dressels, the Coopers 
subpoenaed the U.S. Postmaster in Saratoga Springs, Utah, who provided information 
that the Dressels' mail was forwarded to the same address, 191 Moonlight Dr., Sequim, 
WA, as was previously provided to the Coopers by the Drcsscls. R. at 123. 
13. Coopers' counsel also obtained a Comprehensive Report from Lexis-Nexis, 
which listed 191 Moonlight Dr. as a possible current address for the Dressels. R. at 100. 
14. On attempting to serve the Complaint at Nate Dressel' s last known place of 
business, the Utah National Guard, Coopers' counsel was informed that he no longer 
worked at that location, and had moved to Washington. R. at 100. 
15. Based on the information from the Dressels themselves, the U.S. 
Postmaster, the Lexis-Nexis Comprehensive Report, and Mr. Dressel's employer, 
Coopers effected personal service at 191 Moonlight Dr., which service of process was 
left with Ms. Dressel's mother, Ms. McKellar, on September 26, 2014. R. at 124, 127. 
16. The Dressels failed to file any responsive pleading to the Complaint within 
the allowed time to do so, and accordingly, the Coopers filed a Default Certificates for 
both Nate and Jen Dressel, which were entered by the Court Clerk, Raelene Christensen, 
~ 
on November 5, 2014. R. at 45-46. 
17. Judgment was thereafter entered by the Court against the Dressels on 
.Ji November 14, 2014. R. at 47-48. 
~ 8 
18. Notice of Entry of Judgment was sent to the Dressels on or about December 
5, 2014, at the same address.where service was effected: t 91 Moonlight Dr. R. at 59-60. 
19. Shortly thereafter, the Dressels filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. at 70-98. 
20. 
raised: 
21. 
a. 
b. 
C. 
In Dressels' Motion to Set Aside, only the following arguments were 
The Default Judgment was void for insufficiency of service. R. at 76-78. 
The Default Judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b). R. at 76-78. 
The Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). R. at 76-78. 
The Dressels' Motion did not raise any other issues as a basis to set aside 
the default judgment. R. at 76-78. 
22. The Declarations filed by the Dressels and Ms. McKellar claimed that the 
Dressels did not reside at the 191 Moonlight Dr. address. R. at 91, ,r 3; 94 at ,r 3, 97 at ,r 
r (! 
4~. ~ 
23. However, the Declarations did not provide any address or evidence of any 
place of abode for the Dressels. R. at 91-98. Rather, the Declarations alleged that the 
Dressels had no place of abode, but had resided in a motorhome at the time the 
Complaint was served. R. at 136, ,r 4. 
24. As to the Dressels' Motion to Set Aside pursuant to Rule 60(b ), the 
Dressels did not assert any grounds for excusable neglect, except that defendants had no 
notice of the proceeding. R. at 77. As to the Dressels' meritorious defense, the Dressels 
argued only that the property had been sold after the Dressels unilaterally terminated the 
9 
lease and vacated the Property on August I, 2014, and therefore the Coopers had no 
standing. R. at 77. 
25. With respect to the Dressels' contention that service at 191 Moonlight Dr. 
~ was ineffective, the Court reviewed the Dressels' Motion and supporting Declarations 
and found as follows: 
In considering the circumstances in this matter, at the time of service, 
defendants claim to have left Utah, lived in a mobile home with no address. 
They provided an address in which they expected to be--have their deposit 
sent to that address. It was the 191 Moonlight Drive in Washington. That was 
the same address provided by the U.S. Postal Services as the defendants 
forwarding address. 
R. at 212. 
26. The District Court also found it instructive that the notice of judgment was 
sent to the 191 Moonlight Dr. address as well, which undisputedly did reach the Dressels 
and caused an immediate response from the Dressels. R. 212. 
27. As a result of the facts and circumstances surrounding service, the District 
Court correctly concluded that "all roads point to the fact that this 191 Moonlight Dr. in 
Washington is their usual place of abode and that is where they expected to receive 
notifications regarding any mail that was received." R. at 212. 
28. With respect to the Dressels' Rule 60(b) defense, the District Court 
..;;; correctly concluded that there was no showing of mistake, surprise or excusable neglect, 
as service at the 191 Moonlight Dr. address was valid. R. at 213. 
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29. The District Cowt also correctly concluded that since the motion to set 
aside judgment was denied, the District Court had no reason to mle on the Motion to 
Dismiss. R. at 213. 
30. TI1e Dressels never made a motion for au evidentiary hearing, either 
pursuant to their Motion to Set Aside, at the hearing, or thereafter. See R. at 77-78. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1) The District Court Properly Detem1ined that Service on the Dressels was Proper 
and Effective Under Rule 4. 
The District Court correctly determined that service of the summons and 
complaint on the Dressels at 191 Moonlight Dr. was proper and effective under the 
totality of the circumstances. A review of the affidavits and facts before the District 
Court makes clear that the following facts were undisputed: 1) the Dressels affirmatively 
provided 191 Moonlight Dr. as the address to which the Coopers could provide notices 
with respect to the Lease; 2) the Dressels had their mail forwarded to 191 Moonlight Dr.; 
3) the Summons was left with Ms. McKellar, the Dressels' close relative, at 191 
Moonlight Dr.; 4) the Dressels provided no evidence or actual address of a location 
which could be determined to be their abode or dwelling place; and 5) the Dressels 
responded promptly to the Notice of Entry of Judgment that was mailed to 191 Moonlight 
Dr. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the District Court correctly concluded that 
"all roads" pointed to the fact that 191 Moonlight Dr. was the Dressels' usual place of 
abode for the purposes of service of the Summons and Complaint. 
11 
✓:', 
~ 
2) The Dressels Failed to Make Any Showing of Excuse, Surprise or Excusable 
~ Neglect Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l). 
The Dressels' affidavits and testimony is silent as to the elements required to set 
aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60{b )(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
entirety of the Dressels argument as to Rule 60(b )( l) was that service is invalid, and there 
is "clearly mistake, surprise or excusable neglect." However, as no facts were provided 
~ to the District Court from which the court could have concluded that such was the case, 
the District Court properly determined that the Dress els had failed to make the required 
showing under Rule 60(b )(1 ). Because there was no showing of mistake, surprise or 
excusable neglect, the District Court had no cause to review the Dressels' allegation of a 
meritorious defense to the Coopers' claims. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT SERVICE 
ON DRESSELS WAS PROPER AND EFFECTIVE UNDER RULE 4. 
A. Service at 191 Moonlight Drive Was Appropriate and Effective Under the Totality 
of the Circumstances. 
The clear and undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that service on the 
Dressels was proper and effective under Rule 4 and the case law defining Rule 4' s 
requirement that a person be served at their "dwelling house or usual place of abode." 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(A). There is no dispute in this case that the Summons was 
left with Ms. McKellar at 191 Moonlight Dr., who is a person of suitable age and 
12 
discretion. The only question is whether 191 Moonlight Dr. was the Dressels' "usual 
place of abode" pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l). 
"The detennination of 'usual place of abode' is a mixed question of fact." Reed v. 
Reed, 806 P .2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991 ). The "district court's determination of whether, 
under the facts presented," the place of service "fits within the definition of the usual 
place of abode is a question of law." Id. As such, the determination of whether the place 
of service meets Rule 4' s requirements is a legal conclusion, and is not a factual 
allegation that is properly made in a party's affidavit. That a party may state in his or her 
affidavit merely that the place is not the person's abode is ofno consequence. Instead, it 
is for the district court to review the facts asserted in the affidavits to draw the legal 
conclusion that the place of service does or does not fit within the defmition of ''usual 
place of abode" for purposes of service of process. 
As the Dressels' Brief concedes, the Drcsscls' bear the burden of showing that 
service was improper. See Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 
1998). The invalidity of service can be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 
Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555,557 (Utah 1983). To overcome this burden, a party 
seeking to set aside service is required to provide "competent evidence showing that 
service of process was not completed or was improper." Zions First Nat. Bank v. 
Christensen, 2000 UT App 76, 1, 2000 WL 33243623 (citing Skanchy, 952 P.2d at 1075). 
As the parties' respective burdens on the issue of determination of "usual place of 
abode" and the legal basis for such determination are in place, the significant question is 
now what does "usual place of abode" mean under Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court 
13 
reviewed this issue in Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991 ). In that opinion, the 
Court reviewed jurisprudence from Utah and Federal law. The opinion makes clear that 
''no hard and fast rule can be fashioned to determine what is or is not a party's 'dwelling 
@ house or usual place of abode' within the Rule's meaning." Id. at 1185. Rather, "the 
,.J 
practicalities of the particular fact situation determine whether service meets the 
requil-ements of 4(d)(l). '' id. (emphasis added). Pertinent, and indeed, critical, to the 
determination of the 'usual place of abode,' is whether the place of service is best 
calculated to afford actual notice of the proceedings, which analysis "must be resolved by 
'what best serves to give notice to a defendant that he is being served with process, 
considering the situation from a practical standpoint." Id. Additionally, Rule 4's 
requirement of service at the usual place of abode must be "liberally construed and 
applied to achieve the just, speed, and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 1. 
The entirety of the Dressels' position appears to be that because they claimed in a 
declaration that they did not live at 191 Moonlight Dr., without providing any evidence to 
the contrary, they could not have been served there. In reality, the Dressels seem to argue 
that they could not have been served anywhere but personally, as they claim to have had 
no physical place of abode. In view of Reed and other Utah cases, the Dressels' position 
is inconect. A review of the facts of this case demonstrates that the District Court 
correctly concluded that the Dressels were served at their "usual place of abode," 
·..;J considering the unique circumstances and practicalities of the case. The undisputed facts 
on the record and in the parties' declarations are as follows: 
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1. 
2. 
The Dressels provided the Coopers with 191 Moonlight Dr. as the location 
which the Coopers were to use to provide communications with respect to 
the Lease.1 R. at 119. 
The Dressels instructed the U.S. Postmaster to direct all communications 
via mail to them at the 191 Moonlight Dr. address, thus indicating that 
anyone needing to send them something could do so to that address with 
the expectation that they would receive it. R. at 123. 
3. Information in a trusted and widely used database to locate individuals 
indicated that 191 Moonlight Dr. was the Dressels' address. R. at 100. 
4. The Dressels do not provide even the unsupported allegation, much less 
evidence, that they had another place of abode where service should have 
been effectuated. See R. at 91-96. 
5. The Dressels received the Notice of Entry of Judgment that was mailed to 
the same address, and promptly acted on the same. R. at 91-95. 
The facts of this case line up very well with the facts in the Utah Supreme Court's 
Reed opinion. In that opinion, the party seeking to set aside service: 1) had listed his 
home address as that of his parents; 2) had resided there at one point, 3) failed to show 
that he lived elsewhere, and 4) received actual notice of the proceedings. Reed, 806 P.2d 
at 1185. Based on these facts, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the parent's 
address was the defendant's place of abode. In light of those facts, the court made the 
following statement, which is exactly applicable to the current case: 
the likelihood of defendant appearing at the place of service in the near 
future, coupled with the absence of a permanent residence elsewhere, is 
sufficient to uphold service made at a residence maintained with a member 
of defendant's family even if defendant is seldom there. 
1 While the Coopers claim, and undoubtedly will argue in Reply, that the 191 Moonlight Dr. address was provided 
for the limited purpose of returning the Dressels' security deposit, that address must be construed as the location 
at which notices and information pursuant to the Lease, including a Complaint for breach, could be reliably 
delivered. 
... 
15 
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@ 
Id. at 1185. 
The undisputed facts of this case are analogous to the Reed opinion. The Dressels 
provided Coopers with an address of a close relative to send any notice or information 
pertinent to the Lease, and indeed, by forwarding all mail to 191 Moonlight Dr., 
effectively told the entire world that 191 Moonlight Dr. was the location to which any 
important information could be delivered. That they did receive actual notice of 
important documents delivered to that address is made indisputably clear by the fact that 
they received and immediately responded to the Notice of Entry of Judgment mailed to 
Ga that same address. Of equal significance is the fact that the Dressels have provided no 
other address or location that is their usual place of abode. Thus, the Dressels' position 
that they had no place of abode for service is overcome by the ruling of the Reed opinion. 
Obviously, the Dressels' argument cannot be correct under a fair reading of Rule 4's 
service requirements. Personal service on a party living without an address would be 
effectively impossible, and certainly impracticable and inefficient. A liberal and fair 
reading of Rule 4' s service requirements cannot allow a person to become impossible to 
serve just because they choose to live in a motorhome without a permanent address. 
Finally, while the Dressels provide the self-serving testimony that they did not 
receive actual notice of the Summons that was delivered to Jen Dressel's mother, they 
~ 
provide no evidence or testimony as to why they did not or could not have received actual 
notice by serving the Summons at 191 Moonlight Dr. The process server's affidavit 
..;;; attests that she left the Summons and Complaint with Ms. McKellar at 191 Moonlight 
Dr., which fact has never been disputed. R. at 124, 127. Ms. McKellar's declaration 
16 
does not state-what she did with those documents, e.g., that she left them on the porch, 
threw them away, fed them to the dog, or otherwise did something making it impossible 
for the Dressels to receive them. R. at 97-98. Ofno small consequence is the fact that, 
by appointing Ms. McKellar' s address as the address to which the Coopers could send 
money, and the whole world could send mail, the Dressels obviously relied on and trusted 
Ms. McKellar to preserve any correspondence delivered to her and to provide such to the 
Dressels. Yet, there is no explanation as to why such did not occur, or could not have 
occurred, in this case. As the District Court noted, the Dressels asserted no testimony 
that they were out of the country, out of contact with Ms. McKellar, or in other 
circumstances that would have made it impossible for Ms. McKellar to notify them of the 
documents. R. at 213-14. The District Court is not required to give weight to self-
serving testimony, particularly where it is not sustained by corroborating evidence; the 
District Court correctly disregarded such testimony by the Dressels here. 
The situation here is exactly the situation addressed by the Reed opinion, and the 
same outcome should obtain here as well. The practicalities of the undisputed facts of 
this case demonstrate that service of the summons and complaint at the relative's house, 
which had been held out by the Dressels themselves as the location to which important 
information could be sent, was the location best served to give notice to the Dressels that 
they were being served with process. See Reed, 806 P .2d at 1185. Even if the Dressels 
were not there at the specific time that the service was delivered, every indication is that 
the Dressels would be appearing at or in contact with such place in the future. Service 
was sufficient there, even if, as in Reed, the Dressels may have seldom been there. See 
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id. The fact that the Dressels have provided no other location where they could or should 
have been served, and in fact seem to claim that there was no such location, demonstrates 
that, under the analysis of the totalities of the circumstances, service was proper and 
~ effective at 191 Moonlight Dr. 
B. Additional Arguments as to Service Are Not Preserved for Appeal. 
The Dressels assert four additional arguments against the effectiveness of service 
of process, which are not properly preserved for appeal. (See Appellants' Brief at LB -
I.D, pp. 22-25). "To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must have been presented to 
the trial court in such as way that the court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. 438 
Main St. v. Easy Heat, Incl, 2004 UT 72, ,I 51, 99 P.3d 801. "For a trial court to be 
afforded an opportunity to correct the error, (1) the issue must be raised in a timely 
fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must 
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. "Issues that are not raised 
at trial are usually deemed waived." Id. 
All of the following issues could have, but undisputedly were not, raised before 
;;; the District Court. The Dressels have not asserted that any of these issues could not have 
been raised, or that extraordinary circumstances exist which would have made it 
impossible or impractical for them to preserve the arguments. Accordingly, they should 
not be considered by this Court. 
As will be briefly demonstrated below, however, those arguments are irrelevant to 
the determination of the issues on appeal, even if they had been raised and preserved. 
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1. AS THERE WAS NO DISPUTE OF FACT IN THE PARTIES' AFFIDAVITS 
REGARDING THE FACTS RELIED ON BY THE DISTRICT COURT, THERE 
WAS NO NEED TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
The Dressels' arguments that the District Court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing regarding service of process are misplaced. The facts before the court are 
relatively undisputed. As stated above, it was not disputed by the parties that: 1) the 
Dressels provided the Coopers with 191 Moonlight Dr. as the location to which notices 
under the Lease could be sent; 2) the Dressels forwarded their mail to 191 Moonlight Dr.; 
3) the Dressels provided no address or evidence that another location was the Dressels' 
proper place of abode; 4) the Summons and Complaint were served to Ms. McKellar at 
191 Moonlight Dr.; 5) the Dressels provided no testimony or evidence as to what Ms. 
McKellar did with the Summons and Complaint; and 6) the Dressels undisputedly 
received notices that were mailed to 191 Moonlight Dr. 
Notably, the Dressels have failed to preserve this issue, as they did not request that 
the court hold an evidentiary hearing. Even if they had, the record is clear that the 
Dressels provided no affidavits refuting the facts asserted in the Coopers' declaration 
supporting their Opposition to the Rule 60(b) Motion, and that declaration focused solely 
on attesting to the facts pertaining to service and so forth. In reality, there is no dispute as 
to the facts alleged by the competing declarations. As Reed and other cases make clear, 
the District Court did not have to rely or assess credibility of the Coopers' unconoborated 
statement that "they did not live" at 191 Moonlight Dr. in order to find that such was their 
usual place of abode and the best place to effectuate service ooder Rule 4. Rather, there 
was sufficient evidence provided by the Coopers, which was not refuted, from which the 
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District Court could have made the finding that it reached. Because of the lack of 
disputed facts, the District Court correctly stated that "in this case, it is clear to me that 
that was the address where they said they could be served. I don't see anything that 
really refutes that at all." R. at 214. As such, there was no need for an evidentiary 
hearing to hear the credibility of any of the parties on the issues set out in the parties' 
affidavits and supporting documents. 
2. AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE ARE EFFECTIVE PURSUANT TO RULE 4(e). 
As stated above, the Dressels did not include defective affidavits as a basis for 
Q their Rule 60 Motion, and in fact have never raised this issue prior to their Appellants' 
Brief. As such, the Appellate Court need not review or consider this issue. 
Although the Dressels' argument at J.B., p. 22 of their Brief does not cite to Rule 4 
for support, but cites only a 2006 case in arguing that the Coopers' service affidavits are 
defective, the law relied upon appears to be outdated. 2 The case cited appears to be based 
on a prior version of Rule 4. The current version of Rule 4, effective at least as of May 1, 
2014, states only that "[t]he proof of service must state the date, place, and manner of 
service." Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(l). This version was in effect at the time the Summons 
was served on the Dressels in September of 2014. Additionally, the relevant version of 
Rule 4( e) provides that "[ f]ailure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of 
2 The case cited, Southland Constr. v. Semnani, 2001 UT 6, 20 P .3d 875, cites to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, although that citation appears to be incorrect. Rule 5 deals with service of papers on parties to a case 
after Rule 4 Service of Process has been effected. At any rate, the current version of Utah R. Civ. P. 5 does not 
address the content or requirements for service affidavits. 
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the service. -The court may allow proof of service to be amended." Utah R. Civ. P. 
4(e)(3). 
Plainly, the requirements of the current version of Rule 4(e) are met by the 
Coopers' service affidavits. The affidavits state the date (September 26, 2014), the place 
(191 Moonlight Dr., Sequim, WA) and the manner of service ("by then and there 
personally delivering one true and correct copy thereof, by then presenting to and leaving 
the same with Mr. McKcllar ... "). R. 124, 127. In any event, even if the affidavits were 
defective, such is not a basis to challenge sufficiency of service under Rule 4(e)(3). 
Finally, even if the affidavits were defective and were a basis to challenge whether the 
Dressels were properly served, there can be no harm or justified reliance on the language 
of the affidavits. That documents were personally served on Ms. McKellar at 191 
Moonlight Dr. has never been challenged by the Dressels, and is not at issue in this 
appeal. The only issue for appeal is whether it was proper at that location. The content 
of the Affidavits, even if insufficient and actionable, has nothing to do with that issue. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS CLEAR AND PRACTICAL. 
Candidly, it is unclear what the Dressels attempt to argue in Section LC. of their 
Brief. (See Appellants' Brief at p. 23-24). Certainly, the court's holding does not 
determine that an actual mailbox is or could be any party's dwelling place. The District 
Court's ruling was not based solely on the Dressels' forwarding of their mail to 191 
Moonlight Dr., but instead, it was based on the totality of the circwnstances outlined 
above. The argument that the District Court's ruling invites the determination that a 
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"post office box could be held to be a usual place of abode" is ridiculous, and has no 
basis in the facts of this case. 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT GRANT ALTERNATIVE SERVICE, BUT 
INSTEAD RULED THAT SERVICE WAS EFFECTIVE AS CONDUCTED. 
Again, the argwncnt that the Court or the Coopers effectively sought alternative 
service of the Dressels has never been made in this matter, and cannot be considered for 
~ the first time in this case on appeal. 
A review of Rule 4(d)(4)(A) makes clear that this was not a case wherein 
alternative service was, or should have been employed. Alternative service is appropriate 
where the whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained 
through reasonable diligence. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A). The Coopers employed 
reasonable diligence in ascertaining what, for all intents and purposes, appeared to be the 
Dressels' abode prior to effecting service at 191 Moonlight Dr. That is the address where 
..;;; the Dressels indicated to the Coopers that they could be contacted; that is the address 
where the Dressels' mail was forwarded; that is the address that the Lexis-Nexis search 
provided as the Dressels' likely domicile; and Nate Dressel's employer indicated to the 
Coopers' counsel that the Dressels had moved to Washington state. The only indication 
as to the claim that the Dressels may not live there was Ms. McKellar' s statement to the 
~ process server that the Dressels did not live there. R. at 98. Ms. McKellar did not 
provide an address where the Dressels lived, did not indicate that the Dressels were 
residing in a motor home without a physical address, and in fact, provided no additional 
information to indicate that service should not be effective at 191 Moonlight Dr. R. at 
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98. Certainly, a person's declaration that "they don't live here" is not sufficient evidence 
to believe that alternative service is necessary where all signs point to the fact that the 
address is correct. 
Even if this argument were well taken, the Dressels have not identified any 
prejudice that they have suffered as a result. Had the Coopers had a reason to seek 
alternative service, they would have petitioned the District Court to allow personal and/or 
mail service at 191 Moonlight Dr. anyway, as that was the address that seemed most 
likely to reach the Dressels. In the event the Coopers were allowed mere publication and 
mailing to the last !mown address (where the Coopers lmew the Dressels were not living, 
since that was the rental property), the mail would have been forwarded to 191 Moonlight 
Dr. Of course, it is ridiculous to argue that the Dressels would have received more 
effective notice by publication than by delivering the summons to the Defendant's 
Mother. In reality, such a motion would have only cost the Coopers significant additional 
attorney fees and other costs, while reaching the same outcome - delivery of the 
Swmnons and Complaint to 191 Moonlight Dr. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE DRESSELS' 
RULE 60(b)(l) MOTION. 
The appellate standard of review for denial of a Rule 60(b) Motion is abuse of 
discretion. Ileglesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981). The 
requirements for a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside a judgment are clear, and it is 
similarly clear that the Dressels have no basis to argue that the District Court improperly 
denied their motion. While the Coopers would argue that the timeliness of the Dressels' 
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Rule 60(b) Motion, filed just a couple of weeks after notice was mailed to 191 Moonlight 
Dr., actually demonstrates that service and notice were effective, the Coopers do not 
dispute that the motion was timely filed under Rule 60(b). However, the Dressels 
~ completely failed to make any showing of mistake, inadvertence, smprise, or excusable 
neglect. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l). 
A. The Dressels Failed to Make Any Cognj.zable Argumenl as lo Mislak.e, Surprise. 
or Excusable Neglect. 
A review of the record indicates that the Dressels did not even attempt to raise any 
argument regarding a factual basis for Rule 60(b )(1) below. In the Dressels' Rule 60(b) 
motion, the entirety of their argument as to mistake and excusable neglect is as follows: 
In this case, defendants were not served and had no notice of the proceeding 
until about a week ago. Clearly there was 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect. 
R. at 77.3 The Dressels' Reply in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion does not address Rule 
-.,;; 60(b)(l) factors at all. R. at 133-135. All oral arguments before the court focused on 
whether service was effective and, to some extent, the Dressels' alleged meritorious 
defense. R. at 197-213. 
Where the Dressels have failed to even attempt to make a showing of any of the 
Rule 60(b )(1) factors, there could have been no basis to set aside the judgment pursuant 
3 While the Dressels accuse the District Court of disregarding the distinct separation between the rule (b}(l) 
elements and a (b)(4) void judgment, in review of the documents, it was the Dressels, and not the District Court, 
who appears to have attempted to conflate the requirements of a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) (void judgment) 
with the requirements for a Rule 60(b)(l) Motion (excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence). The Dressels' 
documents did not argue a basis to set aside the judgment under subpart (b)(l). 
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to that Rule. Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that there was no 
mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 
R. The Facts of this Case Do Not Demonstrate Mistake or Excusab]e Neg]ect. 
Again, the Dressels' Brief does not cite any argument ma.de a~ to the Rule 60(b )Cl) 
elements. Their Brief does not identify any facts which could demonstrate excusable 
neglect or inadvertence. But even if any of the Rule 60(b )( 1) factors had been argued 
below, there are no facts that would support a finding of mistake, inadvertence, or 
excusable neglect on the part of the Dressels. Indeed, the Dressels' argument is primarily 
that default judgments are not favored and should be set aside, which is not the case here. 
"To qualify for relief under rule 60(b )(1 ), a party must show that he has used reasonable 
due diligence." Sewell v. Xpress Lube, 2013 UT 61, iJ 29, 321 P.3d 1080. "Due diligence 
is established where the 'failure to act was the result of ... the neglect one would expect 
from a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Id. 
Opinions such as Sewell and Metropolitan Water Dist. are instructive as to what 
could be considered excusable neglect. In Sewell, the appellant had provided a copy of 
the summons and complaint to his insurance agent for handling, relied on representations 
by his agent that the complaint had been forwarded to the insurance company for defense, 
and in general, acted quickly and diligently with respect to the summons and complaint. 
See Sewell, 2013 UT 61 at ,r 30. In Metropolitan Water Dist., although the defendant had 
been regularly served, he provided facts that indicated that he had not seen the complaint 
or summons. In that case, the testimony was that the Defendant was not home, the 
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person who received the documents threw them into the driveway, the documents were 
not in the driveway when the Defendant returned home, and the Defendant entered into 
discussions and negotiations with the Plaintiff after service, which discussions led the 
;_;p Defendant to reasonably believe that no lawsuit was pending. 
Conversely, opinions such as Black's Title v. Utah State Ins. Dept., 1999 UT App 
330, 991 P.2d 607, indicate that a lack of facts demonstrating reasonable diligence and/or 
excusable neglect support the District Court's refusal to set aside a judgment. In Black's 
Title, the court stated that the movant merely indicated that he was under a doctor's care 
~ and unable to work. Id. at ,r 10. He did not describe the illness, nor did he explain how it 
prevented him from talcing the steps required to contest the petition. Id. 
In this case, the Dressels provided no facts nor made any argument that their 
actions were reasonable and diligent if service was proper - the court cannot tell if their 
Rule 60(b )(1) motion is to be evaluated as surprise, excusable neglect, or mistake. 
Regardless of which Rule 60(b)(l) basis the Dressels' claim, no facts are set out from 
which the District Court could have concluded that their actions were reasonable under 
.J any 60(b )(1) grounds. The declarations in support of the Dressels' motion do not state 
,..) 
what happened with the summons and complaint after it was served; no indication is 
made by Ms. McKellar as to what she did or did not do with the complaint. Ms. 
McKellar does not aver that she disregarded the summons because she deemed it 
improperly served, or otherwise precluded the Dressels from finding out about it. 
Similarly, no facts are averred as to any interaction or non-action by any party from 
which a determination of reasonable action could be concluded. The Dressels merely 
26 
provide a self-serving statement that they were not aware of the lawsuit until they 
received the Notice of Entry of Judgment. Assuming service was valid, which the 
District Court concluded it was, the Dressels have failed to make any showing as to how 
their neglect, or the neglect of Ms. McKellar, was excusable in any respect. If such were 
sufficient to set aside a judgment, virtually any default judgment could be easily set aside, 
and Rule 60(b )( 1)' s requirements become meaningless. 
C. Because the Dressels Failed to Show Excusable Neglect, There Is No Need to 
Consider Whether a Meritorious Defense Can Be Demonstrated. 
"In general, a movant is entitled to have a default judgment set aside under 60(b) if 
(1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the 
subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense." Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81,164, 150 P.3d 480. "These considerations should be addressed in 
a serial manner." Id. "In other words, there is no need to consider whether there is a 
basis for setting aside a default judgment if the motion was not made in a timely manner, 
and no need to consider whether there is a meritorious defense if there are not grounds for 
relief." Id. Thus, it is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the 
issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been 
shown." State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 661 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983). 
Because the Dressels did not make a showing of excuse, inadvertence or neglect 
under Rule 60(b )( 1 ), there was no reason for the District Court to reach the issue of 
whether the Dressels had asserted a meritorious defense. Indeed, the Dressels could not 
have made a showing of such, as they asserted absolutely no fact, evidence, or affidavit 
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testimony addressing the issue. Accordingly, the District Court correctly denied the Rule 
60(b )( 1) Motion without review of whether the Dressels had or had not asserted a 
meritorious defense. 
D. Arguments Regarding Damages and Evidentiary Hearing Were Not Preserved 
Below, and Are Insufficient Under Rule 55. 
Although the Dressels argue at p. 33 of their Brief that the District Court erred in 
~ failing to hold an evidentiary hearing as to damages, that argument was not made below 
by the Dressels, and has not been properly preserved for appeal. While the Dressels do 
complain about the amount of the default judgment in their Rule 60(b )(1) motion, such is 
only toward an attempted showing of meritorious defense. Nowhere in the Dressels' 
briefing or oral argument did they assert that the court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing as to damages under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 55 is clear that no such hearing is necessary in this case, even if it had been 
requested by the Dressels. Rule 55(b) states as follows: 
Judgment may be entered as follows: (b)(l) by the clerk. Upon request of 
the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs 
against the defendant if: (b)(l)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure 
to appear; (b)(l)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(l)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l); 
and (b )( 1 )(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum 
that can be made certain by computation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b). Rule 55(b)(2) provides that an evidentiaryhearing can be held by 
the court if it is necessary to ascertain certain facts pertaining to the judgment. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 
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The circumstances of this case meet all of the elements of Rule 55(b)(l), and 
therefore default and judgment were properly entered. The Dressels' default was for 
failure to appear. The Dressels are not persons who arc infants or incompetent. The 
Dressels were served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l). The Coopers' claim was for an amount 
certain. Accordingly. even if the Dresscls had preserved this argument below, it is not 
well taken. Default was properly entered as required by Rule 55(b)(l). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the court should dismiss the Dressels' appeal and enter an 
order enforcing the Amended Judgment. The Dressels have failed to show that the 
default judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As the Coopers are entitled to recover attorneys fees pursuant to the attorney 
fee provision in the Lease, R. at 15, the Coopers request leave to augment their Judgment 
in the amount of their costs and attorneys' fees on appeal, which will be provided to the 
District Com1 by affidavit. 
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